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Abstract Active inference provides a simple and neuro-
biologically plausible account of how action and percep-
tion are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour.
This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction
error: we can either change our predictions to explain
sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can
actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In
active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex
arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created
by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this
creates a conflict between action and perception; in that,
self-generated movements require predictions to override
the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving.
However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally
generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely,
attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations
enables the detection of externally generated events but
precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be
resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence
during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the
consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Ba-
yes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during
movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenu-
ation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion
and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if
attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion
disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency
emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation
between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in
normal subjects—and the reduction in the magnitude of the
illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links
the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory
attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution
of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional
account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false
inference and impaired movement—like schizophrenia and
Parkinsonism—syndromes that implicate abnormal modu-
latory neurotransmission.
Keywords Free energy  Active inference  Sensory
attenuation  Illusion  Attention  Schizophrenia
Highlights
• Sensory attenuation is necessary for behaviour under
active (Bayesian) inference.
• Sensory attenuation can be understood as the attenua-
tion of sensory precision.
• A failure of sensory attenuation leads to false inference
and beliefs about agency.
• This provides a normative account of the force-
matching illusion in schizophrenia.
Introduction
Children discover early in life that although they can tickle
others and be tickled by others, it is almost impossible to
tickle oneself. The commonplace nature of this observation
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hides its profundity—two physically identical sensory
stimuli can be perceived differently, depending on high-
level concepts such as agency or wilfulness. This sort of
effect has now been quantified in a number of tasks and has
been investigated in numerous neuroimaging studies.
However, after more than a decade of research, a simple
explanation is still outstanding. In this paper, we try to
provide a principled account of how beliefs about agency
depend upon the active sampling of sensory information
(active inference), and how this leads naturally to phe-
nomena like sensory attenuation, the force-matching illu-
sion and attribution of agency.
Sensory attenuation and agency
The difference between self-generated and externally
generated tickle has been the focus of many studies (We-
iskrantz et al. 1971; Claxton 1975; Blakemore et al. 1999).
Self-produced tickle is consistently rated less ‘ticklish’
than externally produced tickle, and its ticklishness can be
increased by closing the eyes (Claxton 1975). Tickle is not
the only attribute of sensation affected—self-generated
touch stimuli are also perceived as less pleasant and intense
(Blakemore et al. 1999). Indeed, sensory attenuation is not
limited to somatosensation; attenuation of self-generated
visual (Hughes and Waszak 2011; Cardoso-Leite et al.
2010) and auditory sensations have been reported (Marti-
kainen et al. 2005; Weiss et al. 2011a, b; Desantis et al.
2012).
A measure of sensory attenuation is provided by the
force-matching task (Shergill et al. 2003, 2005). During
this task, instead of reporting sensations explicitly, subjects
match a reference force, either by pressing directly on
themselves, or by using a robot to reproduce the perceived
pressure. Higher levels of matched force are produced
when the force is self-generated, consistent with self-
reports of sensory attenuation.
Sensory attenuation is also evident in neuronal respon-
ses. Subcortically, both cerebellar (Blakemore et al. 1998,
1999a, b, 2001) and thalamic (Blakemore et al. 1998)
activity is reduced for self-produced versus externally
produced sensations. Early sensory responses are also
modulated in auditory paradigms, where these differences
can appear as early as 27 ms after stimulus onset (Baess
et al. 2008, 2009; Aliu et al. 2009; Martikainen et al. 2005).
Repetitive stimulation of M1 (which has a depressive effect
on activity) reduces the magnitude of sensory attenuation
in the force-matching task, as well as in a grip-production
task (Therrien et al. 2011; Voss et al. 2007), whereas sin-
gle-pulse TMS of M1 just before movement onset (which
delays the movement) has no effect on the level of sensory
attenuation (Voss et al. 2006). This suggests that M1 is
involved in determining the level of sensory attenuation but
not in mediating it. In visual studies, the only ERP change
noted thus far is a late (*150 ms) modulation of fronto-
parietal potentials (Schafer and Marcus 1973; Hughes and
Waszak 2011). Concepts, such as meaning, perception of
agency and social factors, can influence sensory attenua-
tion. Curio et al. (2000) demonstrated the absence of the
late (300 ms) ‘oddball’ potentials (usually elicited in
response to rare stimuli which have ‘meaning’ or task
relevance) in response to self-generated stimuli, suggesting
that they are categorised as distinct from externally gen-
erated stimuli at a conceptual level. Sato (2008) observed
sensory attenuation both when participants performed a
movement resulting in a tone, and when they observed
experimenters performing the same movement. Similarly,
Weiss et al. (2011a, b) noted greater sensory attenuation
when participants triggered the experimenter to produce
externally generated tones by tapping them and vice versa
for self-generated tones.
The relationship between sensory attenuation and the
experience of agency is complex. An experience of agency
over movements that generate sensation seems to be nec-
essary for sensory attenuation (Desantis et al. 2012;
Gentsch and Schu¨tz-Bosbach 2011): sensory attenuation
does not occur if movement and sensation are correlated,
but the relationship is not perceived as causal. Some
authors have suggested that the experience of sensory
attenuation is important in labelling movements as self-
generated (Blakemore et al. 2002). In support of this idea,
Baess et al. (2011) found that sensory attenuation was more
pronounced in blocks with mixed self- and externally
produced sensations. In this setting, the attribution of
agency is more difficult than during a sequence of sensa-
tions that are purely self- or purely externally generated.
Sensory attenuation is an interesting phenomenon partly
because sensory attenuation is reduced in schizophrenia
(Blakemore et al. 2000; Shergill et al. 2005), or those at
high risk of developing psychosis (Wilquin and Delevoye-
Turrell 2012). In normal subjects, sensory attenuation is
(negatively) correlated with the level of delusional beliefs
(Teufel et al. 2010). Less sensory attenuation means that
the percepts of schizophrenics are more veridical than
controls and—in the force-matching task—they perform
more accurately (Shergill et al. 2005). This means that
differences between schizophrenics and controls are diffi-
cult to attribute to non-specific effects of long-term disease,
psychoactive medication or social deprivation, and that
investigating this effect might provide clues about the
pathogenesis of schizophrenia. A key symptom of schizo-
phrenia is aberrant perception of agency (Frith 2005),
particularly the delusion that one’s actions are being con-
trolled by others, suggesting the mechanisms that impair
sensory attenuation in schizophrenia are intimately related
to the perception of agency.
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Formal theories of sensory attenuation
Previous explanations for the force-matching paradigm—
that can be applied to sensory attenuation more generally—
have come from engineering approaches to motor control
(Wolpert and Flanagan 2001). In the model proposed by
Blakemore et al. (1999b), the decision to move initiates a
motor command, which is transformed by a forward model
into a prediction of the sensations created by that move-
ment. The real sensations produced by the movement are
compared to the predictions of the forward model to pro-
duce a ‘control theory’ prediction error, which is used to
update predictions and refine the forward model. During
self-generated movement, an accurate forward model
means that there is little prediction error. Under this model,
it is suggested that small prediction errors during self-
generated movement lead to a percept of a less intense
force, relative to the true force.
This model is incomplete in a number of aspects. Firstly,
it is unclear why the intensity of a percept is related to the
size of prediction error: prediction errors are used to update
predictions, but they do not constitute predictions or percepts
per se. Within predictive coding formulations of perception
(Rao and Ballard 1999; Friston 2005), prediction errors play
a crucial role in perception, but again, they are not the per-
cept itself; the percept is a synthesis of prior beliefs and
sensory evidence that is conveyed by prediction errors.
Second, this explanation overlooks the multidimensional
nature of sensory attributes. In the optimal control expla-
nation, any mismatch between the forward model and sen-
sory input is mapped to a single variable that determines
perceived intensity. It is true that parametrically varying the
time delay between movement and sensation—or rotating
sensory feedback with respect to movement—will alter the
force-matching illusion (Blakemore et al. 1999a, b). How-
ever, the optimal control formulation does not explain how
this is caused by the amplitude of prediction error, pooled
over all sensory channels. Furthermore, the amplitude of
prediction error does not seem to be important in deter-
mining the level of sensory attenuation: for example, Baess
et al. (2008) show that the predictability of a self-generated
sensation does not affect sensory attenuation. Crucially, a
self-generated movement that should result in sensation—
but does not—can still cause sensory attenuation, despite the
implicit production of prediction errors (Bays et al. 2005).
Third, there is a set of results that control theory
approach cannot account for. During self-generated
movement, sensory attenuation is often noted in response
to externally generated stimuli (Voss et al. 2008; Rushton
et al. 1981; Milne et al. 1988; Chapman et al. 1987). These
stimuli are applied by the experimenter, so they cannot be
predicted by the forward model and therefore cannot be
attenuated. Additionally, sensory attenuation has been
found for stimuli that occur (up to 400 ms) before the onset
of movement (Voss et al. 2008; Bays et al. 2005) when
they cannot be predicted from self-generated movement.
This attenuation seems to be due to changes in sensitivity
(d-prime) to external stimuli rather than a change in the
response criterion (Juravle and Spence 2011; Van Hulle
et al. 2013). The attenuation of these stimuli—which can-
not be predicted from motor commands—suggests that the
phenomenon of sensory attenuation is broader than sug-
gested by optimal control formulations.
In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for
sensory attenuation based on active inference. Active
inference is based on Bayes optimal accounts of behaviour
and provides a principled explanation of how sensory
attenuation may arise in a Bayes optimal (normative)
sense. This is in contrast to previous explanations, which
have explained sensory attenuation as a quirk or anomaly
of motor control. Instead, we suggest that sensory attenu-
ation is a necessary consequence of reducing the precision
of sensory evidence during movement to allow the
expression of proprioceptive predictions that incite move-
ment. This explanation is potentially important because a
failure of sensory attenuation may result in false inference
about the causes (agency) of self-made acts—a failure that
is characteristic of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.
Furthermore, the neuronal mechanisms behind sensory
attenuation (and compensatory changes in the precision of
beliefs at non-sensory levels) rest on neuromodulatory
mechanisms that have been implicated in psychosis.
In the following, we summarise active inference and its
neurobiological implementation. This implementation is
used in later simulations to demonstrate why sensory
attenuation is necessary for movement. We then simulate
the force-matching illusion using exactly the same scheme.
We conclude by simulating a loss of sensory attenuation
and a compensatory increase in non-sensory precision, as
might be found in schizophrenia. Crucially, this simulated
pathology exposes actors to false beliefs or delusions,
interestingly, with a necessarily antagonistic content. These
simulations do not model all the aspects of sensory atten-
uation discussed above (e.g. Sato 2008); however, we hope
that the principles of active inference—in particular, the
optimisation of precision at different levels of a predictive
coding hierarchy—may generalise to other settings.
Neurobiological implementation of active inference
We start by considering how active inference might be
implemented in the brain. The results of this normative
treatment are differential equations that describe neuronal
activity and ensuing action, which we then use to demon-
strate the necessary role of sensory attenuation and the
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illusory phenomena that it entails. The equations may
appear a bit complicated, but they are based on just three
assumptions:
• The brain minimises the free energy of sensory inputs
defined by a generative model.
• The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical,
nonlinear and dynamic.
• Neuronal firing rates encode the expected state of the
world, under this model.
The first assumption is the free energy principle, which
leads to active inference in the embodied context of action.
This provides a principled (Bayes optimal) explanation for
action and perception, in which both minimise a free
energy bound on the (negative) Bayesian log evidence for a
generative model of the sensorium. This means that mini-
mising free energy maximises Bayesian model evidence.
The second assumption—about the nature of the models
entailed by neuronal circuits—is motivated easily by not-
ing that the world is both dynamic and nonlinear and that
hierarchical causal structure emerges inevitably from a
separation of temporal scales (Ginzburg and Landau 1950;
Haken 1983). The final assumption is the Laplace
assumption that, in terms of neural codes, leads to the
Laplace code that is arguably the simplest and most flexible
of all neural codes (Friston 2009).
Given these assumptions, one can simulate a whole
variety of neuronal processes by specifying the particular
equations that constitute a generative model. The resulting
perception and action are specified completely by the
above assumptions and can be implemented in a biologi-
cally plausible way as described below. In brief, these
simulations use differential equations that minimise the
free energy of sensory input using a generalised gradient
descent (Friston et al. 2010a, b).
_~lðtÞ ¼ D~lðtÞ  o~lFð~s; ~lÞ
_aðtÞ ¼ oaFð~s; ~lÞ
ð1Þ
These coupled differential equations describe perception
and action, respectively, and just say that neuronal activity
encoding conditional expectations ~l ¼ ðl; l0; l00; . . .Þ and
action a change to reduce free energy, where free energy
Fð~s; ~lÞ is a function of sensory inputs ~s ¼ ðs; s0; s00; . . .Þ and
conditional expectations encoded by neuronal activity. The
first differential equation has the same form as Bayesian
(e.g., Kalman-Bucy) filters used in time series analysis.
The first term is a prediction based upon a differential
matrix operator D that returns the generalised motion of the
expectation. The second (correction) term is usually
expressed as a mixture of prediction errors that ensures
the changes in conditional expectations are Bayes optimal
predictions about hidden states of the world.
The second differential equation says that action also
minimises free energy. The differential equations above are
coupled because sensory input depends upon action, which
depends upon perception through the conditional expecta-
tions. This circular dependency leads to a sampling of
sensory input that is both predicted and predictable, thereby
minimising free energy and prediction errors.
To perform neuronal simulations under this scheme, it is
only necessary to integrate or solve Eq. (1) to simulate the
neuronal dynamics that encode conditional expectations
and the ensuing action. Conditional expectations depend
upon the brain’s generative model of the world, which we
assume has the following hierarchical form
s ¼ gð1Þðxð1Þ; vð1ÞÞ þ xð1Þv
_xð1Þ ¼ f ð1Þðxð1Þ; vð1ÞÞ þ xð1Þx
..
.
vði1Þ ¼ gðiÞðxðiÞ; vðiÞÞ þ xðiÞv
_xðiÞ ¼ f ðiÞðxðiÞ; vðiÞÞ þ xðiÞx
..
.
xðiÞx Nð0; PðiÞ1x Þ
xðiÞv Nð0; PðiÞ1v Þ
PðiÞx ¼ diag exp pðiÞx xðiÞ; vðiÞ
   
PðiÞv ¼ diag exp pðiÞv xðiÞ; vðiÞ
   
ð2Þ
This equation is just a way of specifying a generative
model in terms of a probability density over the sensory and
hidden states, where the hidden states have been divided
into hidden states and causes ðxðiÞ; vðiÞÞ. Here, ðgðiÞ; f ðiÞÞ are
nonlinear functions of hidden states that generate sensory
inputs at the first level. Random fluctuations xðiÞx ; x
ðiÞ
v
 
in
the hidden causes and motion of states enter each level of
the hierarchy. Gaussian assumptions about these random
fluctuations make the model probabilistic—they play the
role of sensory noise at the first level and induce uncertainty
at higher levels. The amplitudes of these random
fluctuations are quantified by their precisions ðPðiÞx ; PðiÞv Þ
that may depend upon the hidden states or causes through
log precisions ðpðiÞx ; pðiÞv Þ. Hidden causes link hierarchical
levels, whereas hidden states link dynamics over time.
Hidden states and causes are abstract quantities (like the
motion of an object in the field of view) that the brain uses
to explain or predict sensations.
Perception and predictive coding
Given the form of the generative model (Eq. 2), we can now
write down the differential equations (Eq. 1) describing
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neuronal dynamics in terms of (precision weighted) pre-
diction errors on the hidden causes and states. These errors
represent the difference between conditional expectations
and predicted values, under the generative model (using
A  B :¼ AT B and omitting higher order terms):
_~lðiÞx ¼ D~lðiÞx þ
o~gðiÞ
o~lðiÞx
 1
2
~eðiÞv 
o~XðiÞv
o~lðiÞx
 !
 nðiÞv
þ o
~f ðiÞ
o~lðiÞx
 1
2
~eðiÞx 
o~XðiÞx
o~lðiÞx
 !
 nðiÞx þ
otr ~XðiÞv þ ~XðiÞx
 
o~lðiÞx
DTnðiÞx _~lðiÞv
¼ D~lðiÞv þ
o~gðiÞ
o~lðiÞv
 1
2
~eðiÞv 
o~XðiÞv
o~lðiÞv
 !
 nðiÞv
þ o
~f ðiÞ
o~lðiÞx
 1
2
~eðiÞx 
o~XðiÞx
o~lðiÞv
 !
 nðiÞx þ
otr ~XðiÞv þ ~XðiÞx
 
o~lðiÞv
 nðiþ1Þv nðiÞx ¼ ~PðiÞx ~eðiÞx ¼ PðiÞx D~lðiÞx  ~f ðiÞ ~lðiÞx ; ~lðiÞv
  
nðiÞv ¼ PðiÞv ~eðiÞv ¼ PðiÞv ~lði1Þv  ~gðiÞ ~lðiÞx ; ~lðiÞv
  
XðiÞx ¼ diag pðiÞx lðiÞx ; lðiÞv
  
XðiÞv ¼ diag pðiÞv lðiÞx ; lðiÞv
  
ð3Þ
Equation (3) can be derived fairly easily by computing
the free energy for the hierarchical model in Eq. (2) and
inserting its gradients into Eq. (1). This produces a
relatively simple update scheme, in which conditional
expectations are driven by a mixture of prediction errors,
where prediction errors are defined by the equations of the
generative model.
It is difficult to overstate the generality of Eq. (3): its
solutions grandfather nearly every known statistical esti-
mation scheme, under parametric assumptions about addi-
tive or multiplicative noise (Friston 2008). These range
from ordinary least squares to advanced variational
deconvolution schemes. The scheme is called generalised
Bayesian filtering or predictive coding (Friston et al. 2010a,
b): see also (Rao and Ballard 1999). In neural network
terms, Eq. (3) says that error units receive predictions from
the same level and the level above. Conversely, conditional
expectations (encoded by the activity of state units) are
driven by prediction errors from the same level and the level
below. These constitute bottom-up and lateral messages that
drive conditional expectations towards a better prediction to
reduce the prediction error in the level below. This is the
essence of recurrent message passing between hierarchical
levels to optimise free energy or suppress prediction error:
see (Friston and Kiebel 2009a, b; Feldman and Friston
2010) for a more detailed discussion. In neurobiological
implementations of this scheme, the sources of bottom-up
prediction errors are thought to be superficial pyramidal
cells that send forward connections to higher cortical areas.
Conversely, predictions are conveyed from deep pyramidal
cells, by backward connections, to target (polysynaptically)
the superficial pyramidal cells encoding prediction error
(Mumford 1992; Friston and Kiebel 2009a, b).
In the present context, the key thing about this predictive
coding scheme is that the precisions at each level in the
hierarchy depend on the expected hidden causes and states
in the level above. It is this dependency we have proposed
mediates attention or selection in hierarchical inference
(Feldman and Friston 2010; Friston et al. 2012). Equation
(3) tells us that the state-dependent precisions modulate the
responses of the error units to their presynaptic inputs. This
modulation depends on the conditional expectations about
the states and suggests something intuitive—attention is
mediated by activity-dependent modulation of the synaptic
gain of principal cells that convey sensory information
(prediction error) from one cortical level to the next. This
translates into a top-down control of synaptic gain in
principal (superficial pyramidal) cells elaborating predic-
tion errors and fits comfortably with the modulatory effects
of top-down connections in cortical hierarchies that have
been associated with attention and action selection.
Action
In active inference, conditional expectations elicit behav-
iour by sending top-down predictions down the hierarchy
that are unpacked into proprioceptive predictions at the
level of the cranial nerve nuclei and spinal cord. These
engage classical reflex arcs to suppress proprioceptive
prediction errors and produce the predicted motor trajectory
_a ¼  o
oa
F ¼  o~s
oa
 nð1Þv ð4Þ
The reduction in action to classical reflexes follows
because the only way that action can minimise free energy
is to change sensory (proprioceptive) prediction errors by
changing sensory signals; cf., the equilibrium point
formulation of motor control (Feldman and Levin 1995).
In short, active inference can be regarded as equipping a
generalised predictive coding scheme with classical reflex
arcs: see (Friston et al. 2009, 2010) for details. The actual
movements produced clearly depend upon top-down
predictions that can have a rich and complex structure, as
we will see next.
Simulations of sensory attenuation
This section provides a series of simulations—using the
active inference scheme of the previous section—to
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illustrate the basic phenomena we are trying to explain. In
what follows, we describe a minimal model of sensations
that can be generated internally or externally. This model is
used to illustrate the permissive and necessary role of
sensory attenuation in the production of self-made acts. We
then address the perceptual consequences of sensory
attenuation, in terms of detecting externally and internally
generated events—that has been the focus of much work in
psychology and psychophysics reviewed in the introduc-
tion. Using the same model, we then reproduce the force-
matching illusion by yoking externally applied forces to the
perceived level of self-generated forces. Finally, we dem-
onstrate the disappearance of the illusion and the emer-
gence of false inferences about (antagonistic) external
forces when sensory attenuation (attenuation of sensory
precision) is removed.
The generative process and model
Figure 1 describes the generative process and model in
terms of equations (that have the same hierarchical form as
Eq. 2) and a schematic showing how the hidden states and
causes are interpreted. This model is as simple as we could
make it, while retaining the key ingredients that are required
to demonstrate inference about or attribution of agency. The
equations on the left describe the real world (whose states
and causes are in boldface), while the equations on the right
constitute the subject’s generative model. In the real world,
there is one hidden state xi modelling self-generated force or
pressure that is registered by both proprioceptive sp and
somatosensory ss input. This hidden force increases with
action and decays with a time constant of four time bins
(where each time bin corresponds to about 100 ms). Exter-
nally generated forces are modelled with ve and add to the
internally generated forces to provide somatosensory input.
The key thing about this model is that somatosensory
sensations are caused ambiguously, by either internally or
externally generated forces. The only way that the under-
lying cause of the sensations can be resolved is by refer-
ence to proprioceptive input—that is only generated
internally. This is a very simple model, where the
somatosensory input is being used metaphorically to stand
in for the sensory consequences of events that could either
be caused by self or others, while proprioceptive input
represents those sensory signals that can only be caused by
self-made acts. Active inference now compels the subject
to infer the causes of its sensations:
The generative model used for this inference is shown
on the right. In this model, internally and externally gen-
erated forces ðxi; xeÞ are modelled symmetrically, where
changes in both are attributed to internal and external
hidden causes ðvi; veÞ, with the same restorative dynamics
associated with action above. The hidden causes trigger the
dynamics associated with the hidden states, much like a
push which sets a swing in motion. This means that pro-
prioceptive and somatosensory inputs are explained in
terms of hidden causes, where proprioceptive sensations
are caused by internally generated forces and somatosen-
sory consequences report a mixture of internal and external
forces. Crucially, the precision of the sensory prediction
errors depends upon the magnitude of the internally gen-
erated force (and its hidden cause). This dependency is
controlled by a parameter c that mediates the attenuation of
sensory precision: as internally generated forces rise, sen-
sory precision falls, thereby attenuating the amplitude of
(precision weighted) sensory prediction errors. These
context or state-dependent changes in precision enable the
agent to attend to sensory input, or not—depending upon
the relative precision of prediction errors at the sensory and
higher levels. This context sensitive sensory precision is
shown in Fig. 1 as p.
Notice that, from the point of view of the subject, there
is no real difference between hidden causes of internal and
external forces—other than that the internal forces affect
both proprioceptive and somatosensory inputs, while
external forces only produce somatosensory sensations.
Although action can fulfil proprioceptive predictions, the
subject does not need to know this. In other words, it is not
aware of its reflexes; it simply attributes particular sensa-
tions to particular hidden causes, which we interpret as
self-generated.
Precision and the psychophysics of sensory attenuation
In the simulations which follow, we try to reconcile the
literature on stimulus detection and ratings of intensity by
associating the reported intensity of a stimulus with its
90 % lower posterior confidence bound. This means that
the detectability and subjective intensity are functions of
both the conditional expectation and confidence or preci-
sion—such that stimulus intensity is reported to be greater
when the confidence that it exceeds some threshold is
larger. This is an important assumption because it impli-
cates the subject’s confidence in the estimation of intensity
and therefore speaks to a role for precision in subjective
reports of sensory attenuation. Invoking a (signal detection
or decision theoretic) notion of a threshold rests on the fact
that sensory attenuation is only observed for stimulus
attributes that can be above a threshold; for example,
loudness, pressure, unpleasantness and so on. Stimulus
attributes that do not have an intensity threshold could not
be treated in this fashion and—we would suggest—could
not show sensory attenuation. For example, although one
can attenuate the loudness of an auditory tone, one cannot
attenuate its frequency (which can only change by going up
or down). Put simply, sensory attenuation can only be
416 Cogn Process (2013) 14:411–427
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expressed in sensory modalities that have the attribute of
intensity.
The relationship between physical stimulus intensity and
perceived stimulus intensity is not linear. In many domains,
the relationship is approximated by a power law: that is,
perceived intensity is proportional to physical intensity
raised to the power of an exponent (Stevens 1967). In the
case of somatosensory pressure, this exponent is less than
one (Xiong et al. 2013), meaning that—at higher levels of
pressure—the same increase in physical pressure produces
a smaller increase in perceived pressure. A clue as to why
this might be is found in Weber’s law (Weber 1846), which
states that the just-noticeable difference between figure
luminance and background luminance increases as back-
ground luminance increases. Higher background light
levels increase the amplitude of random fluctuations in the
stimulus, making discrimination more difficult. It could be
that this ‘diminishing returns’ effect seen in pressure per-
ception results from higher levels of noise attenuating the
perception of the stimulus.
As noted above, attentional processing can also be cast
in terms of state-dependent precision. In Feldman and
Friston (2010), we suggest that attention is the process of
optimising precision in neural hierarchies, such that
attended locations or objects are afforded high precision.
This process is exactly opposite to the process of sensory
attenuation described above: during sensory attenuation,
attention is withdrawn from the consequences of move-
ment, so that movement can occur. Directing attention to a
stimulus can increase its perceived intensity: in the visual
domain, this has been demonstrated in the cases of contrast
(Liu et al. 2009; Carrasco et al. 2004; Treue 2004), colour
saturation (Fuller and Carrasco 2006), speed (Turatto et al.
2007), flicker rate (Montagna and Carrasco 2006) and
spatial frequency (Gobell and Carrasco 2005; Abrams et al.
2010). Given that judgements of stimulus intensity are
necessarily subjective, the corollary—that withdrawing
attention should decrease intensity—is entirely sensible.
There is little empirical work directly addressing the effect
of stimulus uncertainty (sensory precision) on perceived
intensity. However, it has been demonstrated that in the
auditory domain, loudness is attenuated by the addition of a
noise mask (Richards 1968; Lochner and Burger 1961;
Stevens 1966, 1967). We hope to address this question in
the visual and somatosensory domain, in future psycho-
physical experiments.
Fig. 1 Generative model: This figure shows the generative process
and model used in these simulations. The generative process (left)
models real-world states and causes, while the generative model
(right) is used by the subject to make inferences about causes of its
sensations. In the real world, the hidden state xi models self-generated
forces that are sensed by both somatosensory ss and proprioceptive sp
input channels. External forces are modelled with the hidden cause me
and are sensed only by the somatosensory input channel. Action
causes the self-generated force to increase and is modified by a
sigmoid squashing function r (a hyperbolic tangent function). The
hidden state decays slowly over four time bins. In the generative
model, causes of sensory data are divided into internal causes mi and
external causes me. The hidden cause excites dynamics in hidden states
xi and xe which decay slowly over time as above. Internal force is
perceived by both proprioceptive and somatosensory receptors, while
external force is perceived only by somatosensory receptors.
Crucially, the precision of the sensory prediction error p is influenced
by the level of internal force, again modulated by a squashing
function, and controlled by a parameter c which governs the level of
attenuation of precision. The pink circles highlight this state-
dependent precision, which effectively controls the influence of
sensory prediction errors during active inference
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Fig. 2 Functional anatomy: Speculative mapping of Eq. (3) onto
neuroanatomy. Somatosensory and proprioceptive prediction errors
are generated by the thalamus, while conditional expectations and
prediction errors about hidden states (circles) (the forces) are placed
in sensorimotor cortex. The expectations and prediction errors about
the hidden causes of forces (triangles) have been placed in the
prefrontal cortex. In active inference, proprioceptive predictions
descend to the spinal cord and elicit output from alpha motor neurons
(playing the role of proprioceptive prediction error units) via a
classical reflex arc. Red connections originate from prediction error
units (n cells) and can be regarded as intrinsic connections or
ascending (forward) extrinsic connections from superficial principal
cells. Conversely, the black connections represent intrinsic connec-
tions and descending (backward) efferents from (deep) principal cells
encoding conditional expectations (~l cells). The cyan connections
denote descending neuromodulatory effects that mediate sensory
attenuation. The crucial point to take from this schematic is that
conditional expectations of sensory states (encoded in the pyramidal
cell ~lx) can either be fulfilled by descending proprioceptive predic-
tions (that recruit classical reflex arcs), or they can be corrected by
ascending sensory prediction errors. In order for descending motor
efferents to prevail, the precision of the sensory prediction errors must
be attenuated
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Functional anatomy
If we place this model in the predictive coding scheme
above, one obtains a simple architecture that is shown
schematically in Fig. 2. The precise anatomy illustrated in
the figure should not be taken too seriously but illustrates
how a generative model can be transcribed into a plausible
neuronal architecture for predictive coding and active
inference. In this particular example, we have assigned
sensory prediction errors to the thalamus, while corre-
sponding expectations and prediction errors about hidden
states (forces) are associated with the sensorimotor cortex.
The expectations and prediction errors about the hidden
causes of forces have been placed—somewhat agnosti-
cally—in the prefrontal cortex. Notice how proprioceptive
predictions descend to the spinal cord to elicit output from
alpha motor neurons (playing the role of proprioceptive
prediction error units) to elicit movements through a clas-
sical reflex arc. Red connections originate from prediction
error units and can be regarded as intrinsic connections or
ascending (forward) extrinsic connections from superficial
principal cells. Conversely, the black connections represent
intrinsic connections and descending (backward) efferents
from (deep) principal cells mediating conditional predic-
tions. The cyan connections denote descending neuro-
modulatory effects that mediate attenuation of sensory
precision. The ensuing hierarchy conforms to the func-
tional form of the predictive coding scheme in Eq. (3). In
this architecture, predictions based on expected states of
the world ~lv can either be fulfilled by reflex arcs, or they
can be corrected by ascending sensory prediction errors.
Which of these alternatives occur depends on the relative
precisions along each pathway—that are set by the
descending modulatory connection to sensory prediction
errors. We now use this model to demonstrate some key
points:
The permissive role of sensory attenuation in action
In the first simulations, we illustrate the necessary role of
state-dependent changes in sensory precision (sensory
attention) in permitting self-generated behaviour. To pro-
duce internally generated movements, we simply supplied
the subject with prior beliefs that the internal hidden cause
Fig. 3 Sensory attenuation and action: simulation results illustrating
the permissive effect of sensory attenuation in movement. The model
was supplied with a prior belief about the hidden cause of internally
generated movement, while sensory attention was high (c ¼ 6). This
prior expectation was a simple Gaussian function of time (blue line in
the lower left panel) and engenders beliefs about forces (upper right
panel), which produce proprioceptive predictions (upper left panel).
Action is enslaved to fulfil these predictions (lower right panel). Note
the confidence interval around the external cause temporarily inflates
during action (lower left panel), reflecting the attenuation of sensory
precision
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increased transiently to a value of one, with high sensory
attenuation c ¼ 6. Figure 3 shows the results of this sim-
ulation. The lower left panel shows the internal hidden
cause (blue line) with relatively tight 90 % confidence
intervals (grey areas), reflecting the relatively high log
precision on this hidden cause of six. Log precisions are a
convenient way of quantifying confidence or certainty
about prediction errors and correspond to the logarithm of
the associated precision or confidence. Prior beliefs about
this hidden cause excite posterior beliefs about internally
generated forces, while at the same time attenuating the
precision of sensory prediction errors. This is reflected by
the rise in the conditional expectation of the internal force
(blue line in the upper right panel) and the transient
increase in the confidence interval about this expectation,
due to the attenuation of sensory precision. The resulting
proprioceptive predictions are fulfilled by action, and they
are sensed very accurately (shown in the upper left panel).
Note that proprioceptive prediction (blue line) corresponds
to somatosensory prediction (green line) and that both are
close to the real values (broken black line). This simulation
shows normal self-generated movement under permissive
sensory attenuation.
Compare these results with the equivalent simulation
when sensory attenuation was reduced from six to two
(Fig. 4). Here, the sensory attenuation leaves the sensory
precision higher than the precision of the prior beliefs
about internal hidden causes. This means that bottom-up
sensory prediction errors predominate over top-down pro-
jections, and the expected internal hidden force is pro-
foundly suppressed—and inferred with a high degree of
confidence. Because there are no predictions about pro-
prioceptive changes, there is a consequent hypokinesia and
failure of movement.
There is an interesting link between this simulation and
a body of clinical, behavioural and experimental evidence
regarding the impairment of movement by self-focussed
attention; that is, attending the actual process of moving.
Attention towards movement has been recognised as a
major factor in the phenomenon of ‘choking’ under pres-
sure in professional sportspeople, where they are some-
times rendered unable to produce over-learned movements
Fig. 4 A simulation of
akinesia: This figure uses the
same format as previous figure
but reports the results of
simulations when sensory
attenuation is much lower
(c = 2). In this case, bottom-up
prediction errors retain a higher
precision than descending
predictions during movement.
Conditional expectations that
are updated by ascending
prediction errors (upper right
panel) overwhelm prediction
errors based upon top-down
predictions, and consequently
infer that there is no change in
the state of the world. This
means that proprioceptive
prediction errors are not
produced (upper left panel) and
action is profoundly suppressed
(lower right panel)
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in a performance situation (Beilock and Carr 2001). Less
extreme versions of this phenomenon are part of normal
experience: most of us can probably recall an incident
when our movement has been impaired when we focus on
it too much. This phenomenon has been described as ‘re-
investment’ in movement and has been shown to impair
performance and motor learning in a number of behav-
ioural simulations (Maxwell et al. 2006; Chell et al. 2003;
Zhu et al. 2011; Malhotra et al. 2012). Experimentally,
asking healthy subjects to attend the production of an over-
learned sequence of key presses impairs performance and
elicits activation in prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex,
which is not activated during natural (unattended) sequence
production (Jueptner et al. 1997). The suggestion, in the
light of our model, is that attending to the sensory conse-
quences of movement increases the precision of sensory
evidence, so that descending predictions of the intended
proprioceptive state are foreshadowed by precise sensory
prediction error—and movement is precluded. In other
words, movement is imperceptible, for both the subject and
any observer.
Figure 5 (solid line) shows the results of simulations
repeated over a range of sensory attenuations, where c was
decreased from 6 to -4, and we recorded the internally
generated force. As the prior precision increases in relation
to sensory precision, prior beliefs are gradually able to
incite more confident movement, with movement being
around half its maximum amplitude when prior and sen-
sory precision are in balance (c ¼ 2, vertical line). In short,
this simple demonstration shows that sensory attenuation is
necessary if prior beliefs are to supervene over sensory
evidence, during self-generated behaviour. However, there
is a price to be paid for the sensory attenuation, which we
consider next.
Sensory attenuation and perception
Clearly, reducing the precision of sensory prediction errors
reduces the posterior confidence in beliefs about their cau-
ses. Figure 3 shows an inflation of the posterior uncertainty
(90 % grey confidence intervals) due to sensory attenuation.
The consequence of this transient uncertainty—due to a
temporary suspension of attention to sensory input—pro-
vides a simple explanation for sensory attenuation in terms
of psychophysical detection. This can be demonstrated
fairly easily by presenting the forces generated by the
subject exogenously and comparing the posterior beliefs
about internal and external hidden states (forces). The left
panels of Fig. 6 show the results of this simulation, in which
there has been a veridical inference about the succession of
internal and external hidden causes (blue and green lines in
the lower left panels), with a reasonable degree of confi-
dence. Furthermore, the predictions about internally and
externally generated sensations are accurate and subtended
by veridical conditional expectations. However, the confi-
dence interval around the estimate of the internal hidden
state is much greater than for the external hidden state. This
means that if we asked the subject to report somatosensory
sensations at 90 % confidence, the externally generated
sensations would be detected much more readily than the
internally generated sensations. This is the essence of sen-
sory attenuation in psychophysical studies and—in this
simulation—rests upon the inflation of the confidence
interval associated with internally generated consequences.
In other words, we would expect a reduction in d-prime for
events that were self-generated, relative to exactly the same
events that were generated externally—as demonstrated
experimentally (Cardoso-Leite et al. 2010). As this reduc-
tion in precision is applied to the entire sensory channel for
the duration of the movement, a reduction in d-prime will
also been seen for external stimuli produced during volun-
tary movement. This result has also been demonstrated
experimentally (Juravle and Spence 2011; Van Hulle et al.
2013). This attenuation is shown by the double-headed
arrow in Fig. 6. Exactly the same interpretation can be
applied to the force-matching paradigm:
Sensory attenuation and the force-matching illusion
The right-hand panels of Fig. 6 show exactly the same
results as in the left hand panels; however, here, we have
Fig. 5 Movement and precision: True internally generated force xi
and perceived internally generated force (lower 90 % confidence
interval of xi) simulated over a range of sensory attenuations, where
c ¼ f6; . . . 4g. Confident movement gradually emerges as the prior
precision increases in relation to sensory precision, with movement
being around half its maximum amplitude when prior and sensory
precisions are balanced (c = 2, vertical line). Force on the y axis is
measured in arbitrary units
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yoked the exogenous force to the self-generated force
perceived at 90 % confidence, (as opposed to the true force
exerted by the subject). In other words, the external force
corresponds to the force that would be reported by the
subject to match the perceived force at 90 % confidence.
Crucially, the internally generated force is now much
greater than the matched external force. This is the key
finding in the force-matching illusion and is entirely con-
sistent with the sensory attenuation literature mentioned
above. In this setting, the loss of confidence in posterior
estimates of hidden states that are self-generated translates
into an illusory decrease in the intensity of percept, and
hence, an increase in the force applied, relative to the
equivalent force in the absence of sensory attenuation.
To simulate the force-matching paradigm, we repeated
these simulations under different levels of self-generated
forces by modulating the prior beliefs about the internal
hidden cause (from a half to twice the normal amplitude).
The results are shown in Fig. 7 (blue line) by plotting the
self-generated force against the yoked or matched external
force with a corresponding 90 % confidence interval.
These results are remarkably similar to those obtained
empirically (Shergill et al. 2003, 2005) and reveal sensory
attenuation through an illusory increase in the self-gener-
ated force, relative to matched forces over a wide range of
forces. In the final simulations, we ask what would happen
if subjects compensated for a failure in sensory attenuation
by increasing the precision of their prior beliefs.
False inference and precision
To simulate pathology of sensory attenuation, we reduced
sensory attenuation and—to compensate—increased the
precision of prediction errors at higher levels in the hier-
archy (by reducing sensory attenuation and increasing the
log precision of prediction errors on hidden states and
causes by four log units). In the absence of sensory atten-
uation, movement can only be elicited when there is a
compensatory increase in the precision of proprioceptive
predictions. In other words, beliefs about an intended
movement have to be held with undue conviction (preci-
sion) to render them immune from contradictory sensory
evidence that has not been attenuated.
These changes to precision mean that sensory attenua-
tion is abolished, as indicated by the red line in Fig. 7 (left
panel). This reports the results of repeating the above
Fig. 6 Simulation of the force-matching task. In the first part of this
simulation (left hand panels), an internal force is generated (from a
prior belief about the hidden cause mi), followed by the presentation of
an external force. The estimates of the hidden states (upper right
panel) are similar, but the confidence interval around the force for the
internally generated state is much broader. If perceptual inference is
associated with the lower 90 % confidence bound of the estimate of
the hidden state, it will be lower when the force is self-generated
(double-headed arrow, upper right panel). This is demonstrated in the
right-hand panels. This is a simulation the force-matching paradigm
where the external force is matched to the lower bound of the 90 %
confidence interval of the internal force. This means that internally
generated force is now greater than the externally applied force
(double-headed arrow, upper left panel)
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force-matching simulations over a range of internally
generated forces but with a compensated loss in sensory
attenuation. The resulting behaviour is very reminiscent of
empirical results found in schizophrenia (right panel—
Shergill et al. 2003, 2005). One might ask why optimal
subjects do not simply adopt this strategy and use very
precise prior beliefs about hidden causes?
The answer is evident in Fig. 8, which shows the results
of a simulation with low sensory attenuation and aug-
mented precisions at non-sensory levels of the generative
model. Here, there is an almost perfect and precise infer-
ence about internally and externally generated sensations.
However, there is a failure of inference about their hidden
causes. This can be seen on the lower left, where the
subject has falsely inferred an antagonistic external hidden
cause that mirrors the internal hidden causes: that is, it
believes that when it presses its finger on its hand, some-
thing also pushes its hand against its finger. Note that this
false inference does not occur during normal sensory
attenuation (see previous figures), where the true external
hidden cause always lies within the 90 % confidence
intervals. The reason for this false inference or delusion is
relatively simple: action is driven by proprioceptive pre-
diction errors that always report less force than that pre-
dicted (if they did not, the reflex would not be engaged).
However, when sensory precision increases, somatosensory
prediction errors become very precise and need to be
explained—and can only be explained by falsely inferring
an opposing exogenous force. In more general terms, to
reconcile a mismatch between the predicted consequences
of action and the state of the world that precedes action,
external forces are falsely invoked. This only occurs when
both the predictions and their consequences are deemed to
be very precise. This false inference could be interpreted as
a delusion in the same sense that the sensory attenuation is
an illusion. Having said this, it should be noted that—from
the point of view of the subject—its inferences are Bayes
optimal. It is only our attribution of the inference as false
that gives it an illusory or delusionary aspect. In the context
of these simulations, the only difference between an illu-
sion and a delusion is the level of the supposed failure of
inference. Here, we have associated false inference at the
perceptual level of hidden states with illusions and false
inference at the conceptual level of hidden causes with
delusions.
Precision and psychopathology
Associating false inference at a conceptual level with
delusions has some face validity in relation to empirical
studies of the force-matching illusion. This illusion is
attenuated in normal subjects that score highly on ratings of
delusional beliefs. Furthermore, subjects with schizophre-
nia—who are prone to positive symptoms like delusions—
Fig. 7 Sensory attenuation in schizophrenia: Left panel results of the
force-matching simulation repeated under different levels of self-
generated force. For normal levels of sensory attenuation (blue
circles), internally produced force is higher than externally generated
force at all levels of force, consistent with published data. Force-
matching typical of schizophrenia (red circles) was simulated by
reducing sensory attenuation and increasing the precision of predic-
tion errors at higher levels of the hierarchy. This resulted in a more
veridical perception of internally generated force (small circles).
Right panel empirical results using the same format adapted (with
permission) from (Shergill et al. 2003, 2005)
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are less susceptible to the force-matching illusion. In other
words, there may be a trade-off between illusions at a
perceptual level and delusions at a conceptual level that is
mediated by a (failure of) sensory attenuation. A mecha-
nistic contribution of the treatment in this paper is to link
sensory attenuation with putative neurobiological mecha-
nisms that involve neuromodulatory changes in the gain of
principal cells reporting prediction error. One important
candidate for this modulation is the dopaminergic system, a
classical ascending neuromodulatory transmitter system
(Howes and Kapur 2009).
Loosely speaking, our simulation results are entirely
consistent with two known pathologies in schizophrenia:
the loss of sensory attenuation and a hyper-dopaminergic
drive to the striatum in acute psychosis. We demonstrated
earlier that an uncompensated loss of sensory attenuation
results in an inability to move (Fig. 4). This state is very
reminiscent of the psychomotor poverty (catatonic)
symptoms of schizophrenia (and other psychotic disorders)
such as immobility, mutism, catalepsy and waxy flexibility.
With waxy flexibility, patients may maintain a fixed posture
for a long time, even though their limbs can be moved easily
by an observer. Increased dopaminergic transmission in the
striatum could increase the gain—that is, precision—of
prior beliefs about the causes of internally generated
behaviour and may reflect a compensation for the loss of
sensory attenuation (as in our simulations above). A hyper-
dopaminergic drive in schizophrenia could then lead to false
inferences about external forces attributed to exogenous
causes (such as in delusions of somatic passivity) or others
in the acute psychotic state. Although it is overstretching the
argument, it is tempting to equate the antagonistic aspect of
falsely inferred hidden causes to the paranoid content of
delusions that are typically seen in schizophrenia.
Our simulations have several important similarities with
some recent simulations of schizophrenic motor symptoms
Fig. 8 Pathology of sensory
attenuation. To simulate the
force-matching results seen in
schizophrenia, sensory
attenuation was reduced and
precision at non-sensory levels
of the hierarchy increased to
allow movement. This results in
a precise and accurate
perception of internally and
externally generated sensations
(upper left panel). However, the
causes of sensory data are not
accurately inferred: an illusory
cause (circled response in the
lower left panel) is perceived
during internally generated
movement that is antagonistic to
the movement. This is because
the proprioceptive prediction
errors driving action are
rendered overly precise,
meaning higher levels of the
hierarchy must be harnessed to
explain them, resulting in a
‘delusion’
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(Yamashita and Tani 2012). In this work, the authors used
a hierarchical predictive coding network to control a
humanoid robot, and observed the effects of network
lesions on both neural processing and behaviour. They
showed that increasing the noise (i.e. decreasing the pre-
cision) in connections from higher to lower hierarchical
areas could lead to catatonic motor symptoms, such as
disorganised, stereotyped or loss of movements. We have
seen exactly the same effects when reducing the precision
of empirical priors in simulations of motor behaviour
(Figure 13 in Friston et al. 2010a).
Finally, one might also speculate that the hypo-dopa-
minergic states seen in Parkinson’s disease would produce
similar symptoms, for slightly different reasons; here,
sensory attenuation might be intact, but hypokinesia may
reflect prior beliefs about self-generated movement that are
held with insufficient precision and are overwhelmed by
sensory evidence that the patient is not moving.
Discussion
The ideas presented in this paper suggest that attribution of
agency—in an ambiguous situation—can be resolved by
attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during
movement: in other words, attending away from the sen-
sations caused by self-made acts. When implemented in the
context of active inference, this context–dependent atten-
uation provides a Bayes optimal explanation for sensory
attenuation in terms of perceptual psychophysics. Fur-
thermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and
reproduces quantitative results. Finally, if attenuation is
withdrawn, the force-matching illusion disappears and
false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is
important, given the negative correlation between sensory
attenuation and predisposition to delusional beliefs in
normal subjects and the resistance to the force-matching
illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links
the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory
attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution
of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional
account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false
inference and impaired movement that are associated with
abnormal neuromodulation.
This interplay between precision, attention, hierarchical
inference and neuromodulation may also have important
implications for functional movement disorders. We have
previously suggested that functional motor symptoms can
be thought of as a pathological attention to predictions
about movement that is mediated by abnormally high
levels of precision in the motor hierarchy (Edwards et al.
2012). The results of these simulations make the strong
prediction that patients with functional movement
disorders should resemble people with schizophrenia and
show no force-matching illusion. We will pursue this in a
subsequent work.
Software note
The integration scheme and Matlab code producing the
results reported in this paper can be downloaded as part of
the academic freeware: http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/.
The routines can be accessed via the graphical user inter-
face in the DEM Toolbox (invoked by typing DEM).
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